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CASE NOTES
that the courts will continue to reject the alternative definitions in Murdock
and instead adhere to the standard set forth in Goodman and Palermo,
i.e., that a specific wrongful intent not to pay income taxes must be estab-
lished.
REAL PROPERTY-REDEMPTION RIGHTS
OF STRANGER TO RECORD TITLE
Smith, highest bidder on certain real estate at a tax foreclosure sale and
to whom a certificate of purchase was issued, petitioned the circuit court
of Cook county to expunge the record of an attempted redemption by
one Lyons, undisclosed agent for Western National Bank of Cicero as
trustee, on the grounds that Lyons had no redeemable interest. The court
granted the petition and entered an order finding that Smith was the
purchaser at the tax sale and that Lyons had no interest entitling him to
redeem. Western National Bank then made a motion to vacate the order.
It attempted to show that it had actual title to the property through
various mesne conveyances, and therefore had an interest which would
entitle it to redeem. The circuit court denied the motion and an appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court of Illinois' which held that Western
National Bank was precluded from redeeming because one of the deeds
in its chain of title was not recorded. Weiner v. Jobst, 22 Ill. 2d 11, 174
N.E. 2d 561 (1961).
An important part of real estate taxation is the body politic's authority
to divest an owner of his property and sell it at a tax redemption sale. 2 The
right of redemption from such sales is protected by the Illinois Constitu-
tion which provides:
The right of redemption from all sales of real estate, for the non-payment of
taxes or special assessments of any character, whatever, shall exist in favor of
owners and persons interested in such real estate, for a period of not less than
two years from such sales thereof.3
Furthermore, Illinois redemption statutes repeatedly refer to the rights of
"owners" and "persons interested" to redeem. Often these "persons inter-
ested" are referred to as "unknown owners."'4
1 Jurisdiction to the Supreme Court is invoked pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
S 75 (1959) which provides in part that: "Appeals shall be taken directly to the Supreme
Court (a) in all cases in which a franchise or freehold ... is involved .... "
2 For an excellent discussion on the whole problem of state taxation and redemp-
tions in Illinois see Corby, Developments in Real Estate Taxation-1950-1960, 10
DE PAULL. REV. 596 (1961).
3 ILL. CoNsT. art IX, § 5. (Emphasis added,)
4 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §5 697-752 (1959).
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Illinois case law admits that a stranger to property, having neither legal
nor equitable interest, has no right to redeem. Conkey v. Rex,5 cited by
the court in the Weiner case, involved a former owner who had conveyed
the land by deed, and then attempted to redeem, claiming that the deed
was a mortgage. The court held that the would-be redeemer had no
interest either legal or equitable, and therefore had no right to redeem.
The rights of persons who have an interest in the land which is affected
by the sale are also established. In People v. Hess," the plaintiff, a purchaser
at a tax foreclosure sale, filed a petition to set aside the redemption of one
Goldstein who was the equitable owner of stock in a dissolved corpora-
tion with two other nominal stockholders. Twenty years prior to the
tax sale, the corporation had gone into bankruptcy and was dissolved but
failed to list this property as an asset in bankruptcy. The court neverthe-
less allowed Goldstein to redeem as an interested party even though his
personal interest was not of record and held:
We think it clear that a complete stranger to property is given no right to
redeem by either section 5 of article IX of the constitution, or the statute in
the instant case.... However, these constitutional and statutory provisions do
not require complete legal title, but only an undefined "interest" in the real
estate.
7
The courts have often repeated that a liberal interpretation should be
given to tax redemptions and have expressed a strong favor to allow such
redemptions,8 and give "statutes authorizing redemption from tax sales a
construction favorable to owners."9 Therefore, it is of much interest that
in the Weiner case, the Western National Bank, which admittedly had
title to the property, 10 was considered to be neither an "owner" nor a
"person interested" for the purposes of redemption.
The Supreme Court in the Weiner case first held that although Lyons
did redeem within the statutory two-year period," he personally did not
5 212 Ill.444, 72 N.E. 370 (1904).
6 7 ll.2d 192, 130 N.E.2d 280 (1955).
7 Id. at 197, 130 N.E.2d 283. (Emphasis added.)
8 Skach v. Sykora, 6 111.2d 215, 127 N.E.2d 453 (1955); Mohr v. Sibthrop, 395 111.
418, 69 N.E.2d 487 (1946); Nudelman v. Carlson, 375 Ill. 577, 32 N.E.2d 142 (1941);
Hruby v. Steinman, 374 IM. 465, 30 N.E.2d 7 (1940); Crowder v. Scott State Bank of
Bethany, 365 111. 88, 5 N.E.2d 387 (1936); Elmhurst State Bank v. Stone, 346 111. 157,
178 N.E. 362 (1931).
9 Elmhurst State Bank v. Stone, 346 111. 157, 162, 178 N.E. 362, 364 (1931).
'0 A deed though unrecorded nevertheless does pass tide, Lucas v. Westray, 408
111. 243, 96 N.E.2d 623 (1951); Naiburg v. Hendrickson, 370 I1. 502, 19 N.E.2d 348
(1939); Williamson v. Williamson, 306 1. 533, 138 N.E. 166 (1923).
11 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, S 734 (1959).
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have a redeemable interest and his agency relationship was not established
until the final order was entered after which no redemption may be made.
The court, however, passed over this point and stated that a stranger to
record title has no right to redeem. Repeatedly the court speaks of "good
record title," and "chain of title"; therefore, it is clear that the unrecorded
deed in Western National Bank's chain of title was the real basis of the
decision. The effect of this decision is that the owner of the fee simple
title to real property may not redeem because of this unrecorded deed,
and that in order to redeem, the would-be redeemer's interest must be of
record.12 In addition, the court held that the highest bidder at a real
estate tax sale is a purchaser who is to be protected against unrecorded
interests by the Conveyance Act.'3 McNitt v. Turner,14 upon which the
majority in the Weiner case relied, is a United States Supreme Court case
which interpreted an earlier Illinois recording statute.15 The McNitt case,
however, involved an action in ejectment brought over thirty years after
the sale. In that case, defendant traced his deed to an administrator's sale
to pay the debts of one Spotts, who died intestate; plaintiff traced his deed
to one Lucas who purchased the land from Spotts prior to his death.
Lucas' deed however, was not recorded until long after the deed from
the administrator to the purchaser at the sale. The court then held that the
term "purchasers" included purchasers at judicial sales. However, the
plaintiff in the McNitt case did not claim his right to the property as a
right of redemption from the sale. He claimed it under the deed made
to him before the owner died and before the sale. The action, in fact, did
not arise until long after the administrator's deed was delivered. The court
in the Weiner case applied the rule in the McNitt case to a tax sale and
considered Smith to be a purchaser at the time the certificate of purchase
was issued to him. Having no knowledge of Western National Bank's
interest because of the unrecorded deed, Smith is protected by the Con-
veyance Act. This seems to be the first time in which the Conveyance
Act has been used to defeat a redemption of real estate. Previously, the
act has only been used to protect subsequent bona fide purchasers of the
real estate.
This decision extends the rights of the holder of the certificate of
purchase. Courts have in the past often minimized these rights and have
considered the holder of the certificate of purchase to have no title or
vested interest, but merely the right to receive a deed if the premises are
12 "Under the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, a stranger to record
tide has no right to redeem." Weiner v. Jobst, 22 I1.2d 11, 15, 174 N.E.2d 561,563 (1961).
13 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, § 30 (1959).
14 83 U.S. 352 (1872).'
15 Ill. Laws 1845, at 108.
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not redeemed. 16 The certificate in itself does not convey title to the pur-
chaser, and on this basis it is difficult to understand why the purchaser
should be protected against unrecorded interests.
The dissent as expressed by Chief Justice Schaefer points out that the
result of the holding is that there is no one who can redeem from the tax
sale involved in this litigation. The Chief Justice also mentions what he
considers to be the unsoundness of the proposition set forth that redemp-
tion can only be effected by those whose interests were actually or con-
structively known to the purchaser at the time of the tax sale.
Future decisions will have to clarify just how far recording of a deed
is a sine qua non of redemption. Would, for example, one who acquired
title to property by adverse possession but whose interest was not recorded
or known to the purchaser at the time of the tax sale be allowed to re-
deem? The statutes hold that "persons interested" and "unknown own-
ers" may redeem. It must be left to future cases to determine how there
can be rights of "unknown owners" if it is required that their interest be
recorded in order to have any effect as against the purchaser at the tax
sale.
16 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Wabash Randolph Corp., 388 Il. 376, 57 N.E.2d 881
(1944).
SCAFFOLD ACT-CONTROL OF CONSTRUCTION AS
A REQUISITE OF LIABILITY
John Gannon, the plaintiff, was employed by an independent contrac-
tor as a bricklayer. The contractor was engaged in rebuilding a freight
dock pursuant to a contract entered into with the defendant-owner. All
construction, including scaffold erection, was done by the contractor.
Although the defendant's architects made frequent inspections of the
building activity to see that the work conformed to specifications pre-
pared by them, they neither inspected the scaffold erection nor exercised
control over the manner in which the work was done. In the course of
his employment, the plaintiff ascended a ladder which was in place against
a portion of scaffolding. As he was about to step onto the scaffold, the
ladder slipped out from under him causing him to fall to the floor. No
employee of the defendant was present at the scene when the accident
occurred; further, there was no evidence of any defect in the scaffold or
ladder other than the fact that the ladder was not nailed to the scaffold
as was customary in the trade. Suit was brought by the plaintiff, under
the civil liability provisions of the Structural Work Act, to recover
damages from the defendant-owner for personal injuries sustained as a
result of his fall. A judgment for the plaintiff was subsequently reversed
